Showing posts with label security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label security. Show all posts

Sunday, 31 January 2010

Security in the Sky with Diamonds

A new colleague asked me recently how I felt about “all the security issues in the sky”. At first, I wondered if I had missed a news story about break-ins at Rupert Murdoch’s satellite TV network. After a little probing it transpired that when she talked of “sky computing” she meant “cloud computing”. Ah, at last we were finally on the “same page”.

It is hard enough explaining what “cloud computing” is to some not in IT. It is even more challenging to teach them about the underlying security issues. There are a range of cloud models from remote hosting to SaaS, but for me, I like the definition of cloud computing that I learned from William Fellows of the 451-Group :
“A cloud is formed upon automatically managed, flexible shared infrastructure, where users help themselves to services via an access API with a per-use pricing model.”
I like to call this the “Pay-per-drink” model of cloud computing. Examples of current cloud computing providers include GoogleApps and Amazon Web Services. Many applications already exist running in the cloud and vary from personal finance management services/sites to security log analysis services. William Fellows also highlights the many barriers to adoption for cloud computing – the key issues are Security, Regulatory Compliance, and Retail Payment methods.

Like all IT systems, there are challenges to provide the usual C-I-A thinking of security (Confidentiality - Integrity - Availability) to systems deployed using the cloud computing model. For me, security is about ensuring that systems can only do what you want them to do – and enforcing that they can do no more. Attacks are typically users doing things in the systems that you don’t want – either because access controls are weak or inappropriate, or due to appalling application development whereby the functionality of the deployed system goes beyond what was expected.

Back to sky computing – I am not sure whether the sky is falling or the clouds are lifting (apologies for the appalling puns) maybe as 2010 unfolds it will all become clear.

Wednesday, 3 June 2009

Unhackable? Unsinkable! -- bold government claims

I am saddened to hear that the current crisis in the UK parliament over members' expenses has resulted in the demise of the Home Secretary. I enjoyed being interviewed last year on national radio to comment on her claims that the UK government's proposed ID card system would be "unhackable". A bold claim indeed, and I said as much at the time.

Anyone involved in IT security will recognize that there are no absolutes as strong as "unhackable" and that there are threats from more than outsiders. (Her claim was that as the ID card database would not be connected to the outside world it would be safe.)

When they pushed her off the docks in Belfast harbour they said that the Titanic was unsinkable. It is a shame the Home Secretary has found herself in need of a lifeboat.

Friday, 22 May 2009

Cloud Computing Expo

Yesterday I was an invited speaker at the Cloud Expo Europe 2009. I spoke about “Securing Virtualized Database Assets” highlighting many items covered in an earlier post. It was interesting to be part of a forum that is substantially different from the Information Security forum – no big vendors like McAfee or Symantec. IBM were at the Cloud Expo and Bob Sutor gave a strong keynote. A few of the exhibitors were organizations providing hosting, whilst others were Linux distribution companies (e.g. RedHat and Ubuntu).

The security of a Could computing environment requires the same care and attention to other platforms. As BT's Bruce Schneier says, cloud computing is like existing outsourcing arrangements which require an element of "trust". Cloud computing also provides opportunities for security vendors. It allows them to make use of utility computing plus shared intelligence to provide a higher quality protection in a shorter time window. This approach of putting security in the cloud is what [Trend Micro CEO, Eva Chen, spoke about on our panel session at RSA last month. The collective intelligence plus the accessible compute power provided in a cloud environment can be deployed for non-realtime security functions like email scanning.

There is still much to be sorted out for how data access in the cloud can be performed in a uniform and secure manner. Those organizations that are hosting virtualized databases in the cloud must ensure they are adequately protected.

Saturday, 1 November 2008

Steve’s musings from RSA Europe 2008

RSA Europe was held again at ExCel at the outskirts of London Docklands. Great venue – but the location is not really London and can disappoint some who travel from abroad. Also the timing was not great for UK-based InfoSec professionals with families –the show was held in school vacation time (half-term).

There were many familiar faces at the show: both at the exhibition and fronting many of the keynotes and other sessions. Art Coviello, President and CEO, RSA Security was pushing for “Thinking Systems”. This is quite close to my heart as my academic heritage links directly back to Alan Turing (who was the “motif” for the show) who spent much of his time contemplating thinking machines. Indeed, some core of these ideas can be found in the core of Secerno’s symbolic machine learning techniques.

RSA was a busy time for me – I was involved in three sessions and manning the Secerno stand along with the great networking that was provided in the evenings. My presentation “Regular expressions as a basis for security products are dead” went down well and even though it was reclassified as “Advance Technical” it did not deter an interesting audience. Some lively debate ensued after the talk. Although I could not make it, another talk mentioning SQL Injection was given – this was the talk on “SQL Smuggling”. I was not able to get to the talk, but the slides looked interesting. I know that the failures, pointed out by the presenter Avi Douglen, in outdated technologies does not apply to the Secerno SynoptiQ new generation technology.

My second “gig” was on Paul Fisher’s (Editor of SC magazine) CTO Panel. Although we were supposed to be blue-skying about “Beyond Tomorrow” it turned out that I was sat in the middle of two Malware CTOs who only wanted to think about malware AV and delivering this as a service. There were times when we were able to get the time horizons of the topics a bit further out. I did like Paul’s question about the Art’s “Thinking System”. I believe – and built that belief into our products - that security (and everything else in life) is a battle for knowledge. Thinking machines need to turn information into knowledge and then we can use that knowledge as a form of defence.

The final role for me was leading a special interest group “Securing Virtualised Assets”. Virtualisation drives down operating cost, but what does it do for security? The SIGs were a far more intimate affair with only 10 seats available around a table. It was pleasing to find security professionals who were being proactive in their company’s virtualisation efforts. It seems that there is confidence in how to tackle the security of back-office virtualisation projects. What was more edgy was how to do the same for the desktop. Interestingly, one of the attendees of my SIG was from Dell who had just announced that they were offering outsourced virtualised desktops.

Bruce Schneier’s address was as thought provoking as usual. He, like me, clearly sees that we are still the pioneers of computing as the field is still less than a century old. He drew analogies with industrialisation where output was important and pollution was seen as a necessary side effect. In the Internet era he likes to think of the massive data collection and the lack of care in its production and storage as being analogous to industrial pollution. One day, society will be forced to stop information pollution, and possibly need to go back and clean the information litter landscapes.

I chatted to Bruce after his book signing queues had died down. Last year, he left a message in the front of his book that he signed for me– and his message was “encrypted”. When I got home last year I gave it to my then 12 year old daughter to crack – “she got it in 5 minutes – right” said Bruce this year, in his rapid fire sentences. “Of course ...” was my reply.

Confession time...I did not tell him I had failed to crack it myself J.

No books for Bruce to sign from me this year. But Wiley, the publisher, did sell me Petzhold’s 2008 book “The Annotated Turing” on Turing’s famous 1936 paper on Computability and the Turing Machine. It is a good read – beautifully written – making the mathematics truly graspable.

At the exhibition the interesting new technologies were few and far between. I did quite like the concept behind the Yubico USB key fob providing one-time-authentication keys from a small USB device with a cute button. I chatted to the CEO of the Swedish company BehavioSec who provide behaviour “biometric” information making it possible to detect when keyboard activity is coming from a different user. I did manage to meet up with the MD of DISUK, Paul Howard who has a really neat solution to encrypting tape backups – put one of their SCSII encryption devices in the SCSII device chain –job done! Paul is a passionate gliding instructor which allows him to see the world from a different perspective at times.

The final keynote I saw was that from the UK's Information Commissioner, Richard Thomas. He seems to be getting traction and a larger budge to fulfil his mission to support both Data Protection and Freedom of information which is good. His view is that breach legislation needs to be risk based, not simply for every breach. His argument is that we should not worry about low volume, low impact breaches. Tell that to the individual that has to reclaim their stolen identities and refill their bank accounts – that they don’t need to be notified that their very identity is at risk.

Finally, the conference organizers were promoting Alan Turing as the “brand” for the conference. I wonder what Dr Turing would have made of his image and the promotional videos about the place. They even had a display of encryption devices including the Enigma that Turing played a part in breaking. In reality, the successes at code breaking were massive team efforts. No single person “cracked” the Enigma code. Oh – by the way – there were many other codes than Enigma that needed cracking during WWII – and they were! Turing, rightfully, is one of the very few fundamental computer scientists – but we should remember that he was not the only code breaker.

Steve Moyle

Sunday, 24 August 2008

Who can we trust?

I saw this today and sighed. Another embarrassing example of data loss from a government department; in the UK this time. Encryption of the data was provided at source, yet it is strange that encryption was not enforced throughout the complete data processing chain.

Management of sensitive data continues to be imperative. This sensitive data loss highlights the inappropriate attitude with regard to security and clearly shows that data security remains out of control. There is a distinct requirement for all government employees to protect the storage of data, including limiting the need for physical transportation, through the implementation of strict guidelines. Sensitive data should be held only where it can be kept most secure, and not downloaded to numerous portable devices or hard copy unless there is a well-justified need to do so – a need that is set out in, and enforced by, corporate guidelines.

If the government sector doesn't sort its house out, I fear we are going to see more high-profile breaches. Leaving us all with the uncomfortable question: if we can't trust the government with our information, who can we?

Steve Moyle

Thursday, 14 August 2008

Compliance is not security

IT Security professionals want systems that provide strong controls to protect their organization's assetts. They often find that they are competing for budget from compliance demands.

Compliance is tradiationally a procedure based process that does not necessarily tie into a technological control. There are examples of 'compliant' systems not providing security (e.g. PCI compliant Hannafords).

There is now a trend to deploy Data Leakage tools -- not to prevent data leakage -- but rather so that when (not if) a data leak occurs a record of what has been lost can be used to comply with the growing number of Breach Notification Laws, by contacting those whose records have been 'lost'.

Surely implementing controls that prevent data leakage would be a more proactive approach. Strong security also provides compliance.